SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS - MAY 24: Stephon Castle #5 of the San Antonio Spurs dunks the ball against Shai Gilgeous-Alexander #2 of the Oklahoma City Thunder during the third quarter in Game Four of the NBA Western Conference Finals at Frost Bank Center on May 24, 2026 in San Antonio, Texas. NOTE TO USER: User expressly acknowledges and agrees that, by downloading and or using this photograph, User is consenting to the terms and conditions of the Getty Images License Agreement. (Photo by Alex Slitz/Getty Images) | Getty Images Just two days before Waterloo, a pair of battles were fought that ultimately tipped the balance of arguably the most famous battle ever fought. They occurred simultaneously, on June 16th of 1815, just eight miles apart, and they could not have gone more differently. Napoleon, who had briefly reasserted himself as Emperor of France, personally led 2/3 of his army towards the mass of the Prussian army around the village of Ligny, intending to both destroy the majority of the Prussian forces and serve as a distraction so that the remaining 1/3 of his forces could capture the critical crossroads at the British-held Quarte Bras. Napoleon had been declared an outlaw and (essentially) a global threat by the international Congress of Vienna in March, and the English, Russians, Prussians, and Austrians had each committed 150,000 soldiers apiece to the effort to subdue him. Knowing that time was of the essence, Napoleon moved to destroy the existing 7th Coalition forces before an overwhelming host could be fully assembled to move against him. He hoped to push the British to the edge of the English Channel and to knock the Prussians fully out of the war. Miscalculating that Napoleon would try to surround the Coalition through the use of paved roads, with the desire to cut off all supply chains (one of Napoleon’s favorite strategies), the Duke of Wellington failed to anticipate a divide-and-conquer strategy, which gave the French army time to position themselves as a wedge between his army and that of the Prussians, having gained almost a day’s march though a mixture of surprise and false intelligence. Seeing Wellington and his troops as the lesser threat, Napoleon turned his attention to a familiar opponent in Generalfeldmarschall Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher. Though his opinion of Wellington was erringly low (he often insinuated that Wellington’s reputation was due to an inferior level of military action and strategy from fighting in India), Napoleon had reason to fear Blücher, who had played a significant part in the defeat at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813 that had led to his abdication and initial exile to the Isle of Elba. It was Napoleon’s personal assessment that Blücher was stubborn and untiring, and knew no fear. He called him an old rascal who was always able to get up on his feet again and be ready for the next battle. Following a defeat, Blücher had frequently returned to attack him again. And, like Napoleon, he believed in achieving a decisive victory as quickly as possible, irrespective of the cost. It was often said that Blücher had established “a Prussian way of war” that had an abiding influence on those who came after, and that he served as the prevailing spirit of the Prussian army. By defeating him, Napoleon hoped to demoralize the Prussians in addition to destroying their forces. And this is where the Oklahoma City Thunder come in. Like Napoleon, they hoped to demoralize the young Spurs with their previous victories. They underestimated a shrewd younger general in favor of a spirited older retiree. They took advantage of confusion, miscalculation, and injury, and assumed it would lead to further victory. They cried foul at the unity of the NBA fandoms in opposition to them, and being branded as an unethical dictatorship, and took for granted their own brilliance in the face of worthy opposition. And in doing so, they lost a critical battle. Quite possibly the most critical battle before a final defeat. You see, Napoleon, for all his military genius, had picked the wrong target. True, there were various miscommunications and the decisions of other Generals to blame, but the chief issue was that he had determined that he could have his cake and eat it too. By underestimating Wellington and prioritizing an old grudge against the aging Blücher, he had convinced himself that he could take the crossroads *and* destroy an army, not bothering to consider that if he failed to take the crossroads, all would be for naught. And that’s exactly what happened, with one additional wrinkle: Napoleon also failed to destroy the Prussian army. A critical miscommunication in the marching orders of Major-General Jean-Baptiste Drouet (who was ordered to advance on Ligny by Napoleon, and then to withdraw to Quarte Bras by Marshall Michel Ney as a result of confusion on the part of General Dominique Vandamme) caused the critical I Corps of the Armée du Nord (French Army of the North) to completely miss out on the fighting of both battles, having stopped kilometers short of Ligny, thus depriving Napoleon of the 20,000 troops needed to either wipe out the Prussians or take Quarte Bras. The other mistake Napoleon made was assuming that he could demoralize the Prussians. Though his men did succeed in wounding Blücher to the point of withdrawal from the battle, he failed to anticipate the effect that Blücher had had on his men. Once it was clear that Blücher was incapacitated, his chief of staff, General August Neidhardt von Gneisenau assumed command, and in true Blücher fashion, commanded a savage (and somewhat unexpected) counterattack on Napoleon’s forces. Without the support of his missing 20,000 men, Napoleon was unable to stop the Prussians from reforming their defensive lines, from which they were able to arrange a more strategic and orderly retreat, specifically in the direction of Wellington’s forces at Quarte Bras. Napoleon had accidentally united the armies he had attempted to split, and inadvertently reinforced the crossroads that kept the 7th Coalition supplied and open for more reinforcements. Even though the then 72-year-old Blücher had been fallen on by the horse that was shot out from under him, his men retained their sense of order and organization as he was medically evacuated, “…effecting its retreat in squares, in perfect order, though surrounded by the enemy, bravely repelling all further attacks made in the repeated but vain attempts to scatter it in confusion.” Hopefully, by this point, the Blücher metaphor is starting to make sense. Like Napoleon, the Thunder came into Game 4 thinking that they had already demoralized the Spurs, and that now that would allow them to destroy the Spurs and put them on the brink. They completely miscalculated the effect that the Spurs as an organization have on each other, from the Jefe and the front office, to previous veterans, to the resilience that they’ve shown all season and postseason. The Spurs are going to counterattack. And if they retreat, they’re going to do so strategically. It doesn’t matter who’s missing, who’s been incapacitated, how badly they’ve lost, or who has to take command of and marshal the forces. Attacking them only unites them. Miscalculating only gives them the advantage. The absence of Popovich on the sidelines means nothing. Underestimate Mitch Johnson and his staff at your own risk. If the Spurs can’t hit their threes (29), they’ll make sure you don’t (18%). If you bog down their offense (39%), they’ll bog yours down right back (33%). They’ll out-rebound you, even if they have to do it with guards. They’ll cut down on their turnovers and harass you into more. A win means nothing against them unless it’s the right one. The effect doesn’t last. They don’t care because they don’t know any better, and their support structure is better than yours. Blücher was able to return to his army and (briefly) to command them from horseback during the battle of Waterloo, after bathing his wounds in a liniment of rhubarb and garlic (and imbibing an impressive dose of schnapps). “Forwards!”, he was quoted as shouting by his compatriots, “I hear you say it is impossible, but it has to be done! I have given my promise to Wellington, and you surely don’t want me to break it?! Push yourselves, my children, and we’ll have victory!” With Waterloo hanging in the balance, the Prussian army intervened in a decisive and crushing manner, with Blücher’s vanguard diverting Napoleon’s badly needed reserves, and his main army pulverizing the right side of the remaining French forces. In Game 3, the Thunder won going away. Napoleon won his victory at Ligny decisively. It was the last victory of his military career. It ended up costing him everything. He won the wrong battle, and it lost him the war. Takeways There’s been a (somewhat) reasonable amount of concern surrounding the role and future of Harrison Barnes when it comes to this team. As the season wore on, it started to become clear that he was losing a step or two, and his shooting slump has continued into the postseason to such an extent that many began to question whether he warranted playing time at all. I myself was starting to become worried, and I’ve spent some time defending him in the past. However, the Spurs proved again what a benefit their depth truly is, as his defensive presence was a critical part of a defensive adjustment that kept OKC’s sharpshooters at bay. Despite going 0-4 on the evening, he finished the game with the highest +/- of the bench squad, and made for some youthful errors from the more athletic Carter Bryant that landed him on the disciplinary side of Mitch Johnson. Not only is that something that Johnson needs to be able to do without having to worry about Bryant’s replacement, but it put Barnes’ savvy on full display in front of the rookie. And if there’s someone I’d love to see him emulate (for now), it’s Harrison Barnes. I sincerely hope he opts to stay in San Antonio for what will almost certainly be less money than he probably could get on the open market. He was ready in a pinch, with no hint of animosity, and he made a difference. He’s an ideal vet. A major factor in this series has been three-point shooting, and while the Thunder deserve credit for the quality of their perimeter defense as a part of that, it’s a rough time for Fox, Castle, Harper, Barnes, and Champagnie to all be shooting 25% or less from long distance. It’s easy to say that the Spurs would be winning the series if they could hit their threes, but I really do think they could run away with it if they could just have their most important shooters return to the mean from 3. They’re shooting 32% from three, and they just cannot count on that working for the length of the series. De’Aaron Fox led the team in rebounds. I repeat, De’Aaron Fox, who has been visibly hampered by his ankle injury, led the team in rebounding. You typically need to be able to jump for rebounds. The ankle is usually pretty integral to that. Say what you want about the contract, but that dude is doing whatever it takes, through the pain, and he must be tough as hell to have managed that. His stats don’t seem eye-popping, but he was the first Spur to have a double-double + 5 assists, with no turnovers, since LaMarcus Aldridge, and he was absolutely critical in Stephon Castle being able to do what he does best, without hampering the offense with occasional brain-farts. Turns out the team is at their best when that happens, making Fox’s toughness a critical asset for a Spurs team that was facing going down 1-3 to the defending champs. What a bro. What a chad. What a Spur. Playing You Out – The Theme Song of the Evening: Waterloo by Abba ...read more read less